Abstract-This paper is concerned with the class of two-person twoobjective decision problems characterized by quadratic cost functions and static information structures. The primitive random variables are assumed to have u priori known but arbitrary probability distributions with finite second-order moments. For this class of problems, sufficient conditions are derived for the existence of a unique pair of equilibrium solutions. These sufficient conditions are independent of the probabilistic structure of the problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
NE OF THE landmarks of decision and control theory will be the development of a general theory to solve multiperson multiobjective decision problems. Results available in stochastic control. team theory. minimax estimation and control, and decentralized control can all then be considered as special and extreme cases of this general theory.
Quite a lot is known today concerning problems in stochastic control with the classical information structure: major difficulties that arise with regard to their solutions and their properties such as existence and uniqueness have mostly been resolved: in particular. the solution to the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) problem is completely known.
If we have decentralization in a stochastic control problem, the problem becomes more difficult. and relatively little of sufficient generality is known in this area. What we are faced with here is a team problem, originally formulated by Marschak [I61 almost two decades ago. in which each decision maker (DM) does not necessarily know what his predecessors have known or how they have acted, but every single DM strives for the same goal. A stochastic control problem with a nonclassical information structure can be considered within this context. One of the most important results in this area is Radner's theorem on teams with static information structures, which roughly states that a static LQG team problem admits a unique globally optimal linear solution [17] .' This result is extended by Hartman [9] to include the case in which the observation set a player receives is random before the team acts. Ho and Chu have studied in [ 101 and [7] information structures of teams. and have applied Radner's theorem to problems of dynamic team decision making via the concept of nesting. This application, however, is for a special class of information structures, and it is well known via Witsenhausen's counterexample [ 181 that Radner's theorem cannot in general be extended to encompass even the simplest dynamic team problems with nonclassical information structure. Another special class of decentralized stochastic control problems have been considered by Aoki in [ I ] with DM'S having different a priori information on the system's initial state. where only suboptimal control laws have been obtained.
Minimax control problems are on the other extreme side of the spectrum, within the general framework of multiperson multiobjective decision making under uncertainty. These problems are characterized by two DM'S having completely conflicting objectives. and interpreted as a zero-sum stochastic game optimal solutions of these decision problems are known as saddle-point solutions. For the LQG problem with the static information structure. it can easily be shown that under certain conditions there will exist an admissible saddle-point solution in linear strategies-which is the minimax counterpart of Radner's theorem on team problems. Even with a dynamic nonclassical information structure, it has been shown in [5] that the LQG problem admits a saddle-point in linear strategies. which indicates that Witsenhausen's counterexample cannot be extended to this end of the spectrum.
Now. within the context of two-person decision making, we have the important class of problems in between the two aforementioned extreme ends, namely the two-person two-objective decision problems in which neither a direct conflict nor a mutual common goal necessarily exists. An acceptable solution concept for this class of decision probthis important theorem, but we will not go into any further details here 'Radner's cited paper in fact contains more on static teams than just since they are not directly relevant to the contents of the present paper. lems is the Nash solution which has earlier been introduced in [4] within the context of stochastic nonzero-sum games and which 1) becomes a saddle-point solution for the special case of minimax problems, and 2) can be interpreted as a person-by-person optimal solution for the special case of team problems. Even for the LQG problem with the static information structure, almost no results of sufficient generality are available in the literature. Since both minimax and team problems within this class admit unique linear optimal strategies, it might be conjectured that the Nash solution to this two-person two-objective decision problem will be a unique linear pair of strategies. But not much has been done so far in either proving or disproving this conjecture. Only recently, Ba9ar and Ho have shown existence of a unique Nash equilibrium point in linear strategies, for a special class of LQG problems in which the decision variables are scalar [4] . The method employed there cannot be extended to develop similar conclusions for the case when decision variables are vector-valued. Hence a different method had to be sought in order to obtain a result of sufficient generality.
In this paper we show that, under some sufficient conditions, the LQG problem mentioned above will admit unique Nash equilibrium strategies which will be linear in the observations of each DM. We go a step further and show that Gaussianness is not necessary to establish uniqueness, and prove existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium point for the most general quadratic objective functions and with arbitrary but fixed probability structure (under the assumption that the second-order moments of the primitive random variables involved are finite). The sufficiency conditions of existence are independent of the probabilistic structure of the problem. In establishing uniqueness, we actually make use of the fixed point of an appropriately structured Banach space. For the special extreme cases, conditions of existence of a global optimum for the team problem and a saddle-point for the minimax problem are implied by our sufficiency condition of existence.
In the next section we formulate the two-person twoobjective decision problem. In Section 111, we construct a Banach space and prove existence of a unique Nash point under the general probability structure. In Section IV, we show that when the primitive random variables involved are jointly Gaussian, this unique Nash point will be realized by linear policies. In Section V we relate our results an ' will be denoted by P,, which is assumed to have finite second-order moments. Each DM is provided with information about the value of the random variable x through an mi-dimensional vector zi (i standing for DMi) which is defined on a measurable space (Qz,, Fzi). To complete the description of zi, we assume that for each fixed Fi E Fzi, a Borel-measurable function of x is given (known as the conditional probability of 4 given x ) to be denoted by Pi(<.lx) for the ith DM.
By the product measure theorem, this defines a unique probability measure on the product space (QxXQzi, Tx X Tzj), which in turn assigns a unique probability measure to SZ,, which we denote by Pi. This makes zj a random vector properly defined on the probability space ( Q z , , Fzj, P i ) , and zi induces a probability measure on %-, to be denoted by P,,.
Decision variable of DM i will be denoted by uj and will assume values in the Euclidean space Rrl. The quadratic objective function (cost function) of DMi will be defined by 
defines the most general quadratic function of the three variables x , u l , and u2. As it will be clear in subsequent sections and in particular in Lemma A1 of the Appendix, because of the static nature of the information available to either DM, the "active" part of any convex quadratic objective function (i.e., the part of the objective function that determines the optimal decisions) can in fact be written as in (1).
The decision law yi of DMi is a real-vector-valued Borel-measurable function on ( R -, %-), mapping this observation space into (RC, C E r r ) , the decision space. Denoting the space of all Borel-measurable functions J; : ( R m l , '%q)+(RC, % r ; ) which further satisfy the requirement JRmifTfidPz, < co by L:, we require that each permissible y j be in L,". That is, we seek measurable vector-valued functions which are also square-integrable componentwise with respect to the measure Pz,. paper ends with concluding remarks and an Appendix which contains proofs of some important auxiliary lemmas.
THE TWO-PERSON TWO-OBJECTIVE DECISION PROBLEM
where Q 2 R ( n + m l + m a and P denotes the product .probability measure P,XPzl XP,, defined in the sense of Loeve 1131. It can be shown by standard techniques of analysis An equilibrium solution for this multiobjective decision problem is any pair of policies { y: E Lr:l, y; E L,:} satisfying the inequalities and for all y I E Lr:l, y,E L:. That is, roughly speaking, each DM seeks a permissible decision rule so as to minimize his own average cost against some optimal policy of the other DM. Thinking of this decision problem as a noncooperative nonzero-sum game, we note that such an equilibrium solution is known as a Nash solution, and J(y;.y;) is said to be the expected (average) Nash cost of DMi corresponding to the optimal pair { y:? y:}.
Within the setup described above, we now derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium point.
EXISTENCE CONDITIONS FOR A UNIQUE NASH POINT
Before we can state our main theorems we have to define the following notation and recall a well-known result in real analysis, which will be used in the sequel.
The space L:, which was defined in Section 11. can be turned into a metric space by defining the norm where the subscript ri stands for the dimension of the vector-valued function y E LI;" and the superscript zi identifies the probability measure PI,. In fact (4) is only a seminorm on L:, but can be made into a norm by passing into equivalence classes with respect to Pz,. Denoting the subset of L:, which is the collection of these equivalence classes of functions, by q, (4) now defines a norm on this new space and e becomes a linear space. It can further be shown that is also complete. i.e., it is a Banach space (see, e.g., Ash [2, p. 851 for a proof of this important result, which is given there for ri= 1 but can easily be generalized to ri > 1).
We can now state our first theorem. Partly in the proof of this theorem and partly in the proof of Theorem 2. we will need the following important result.
Lemma I
Let zl, z2 be random vectors defined as before. Then for any 5 -measurable function yj E Q, ZJ 1) E [y,(z,)lzi] is ?Tzi -measurabfe and is in q,
2) the h e a r operator E,li. defined by Proof of Lemma I : 5 -measurability of q l i y j is a wellknown result in probabillty theory (see, e.g., Loeve [13, p. 3411) and hence it will not be proven here. To complete the proof of the lemma it will be sufficient to show that E , l i is a nonexpansive mapping, because it then follows from (6b) with t= 0, a.e.. P, that qliy, E 2 : since y, E PJ . Now note the following sequence of inequdities, where y : 5 will denote the kth component of the vector-valued function y,:
where the last expression follows from the well-known Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (see. e.g., Ash [2. p. 821). Therefore we have But since expectation is the expectation of a conditional expectation, the last expression is identical to Hence we have proven where E [ f ( -)Izi] denotes the expected value of f( e ) conditioned on the-observed value of the random vector zi.
But since e; is a linear space and E i l i is a linear operator, existence of a unique solution to (5). But before stating inequality (bC) is equivalent to inequality ((3,).
Q.E.D. the theorem we will recall Banach's classic contraction complete metric space. If f maps X into itself and if for some a, 0 < a < 1, f satisfies proof of Theorem 1: We first note that for fixed y, E q, mapping principle which be used in the proof of
Banach's Contraction Mapping Principle:
Let ( . [Diiy,(z,) + CiX]dP(X,Z,,Z2).
then f has a unique fixed point a in X (i.e., a point a such that f ( a ) = a ) which can be realized as the limit of the sequence of Picard iterates { f " ( x ) } for each x in X. 
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where the first inequality is known as the triangle inequality, the second one follows. from the fact that A 'A Q X(A)I, for allp X q matrices A , the third one follows from Lemma 1, and the last inequality is a result of the assumptions that 1) all matrices have bounded elements and Dii >0, 2) x has bounded second-order moments, and 3)
y, E e.:. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. Q.E.D. Thg next step is to find the conditions under which there will exist %zi-measurable functions yi E which will consistently solve (5). For the equilibrium solution to be a reliable one, it is crucially important that we also have a uniqueness result since otherwise an existence result would not mean much. The following theorem does this and provides us with a set of sufficient conditions for there exists a unique pair of %=, -measurable yi E e that solves (5). Equivalently, under either of conditions (7), the decision problem of Section I1 admits a unique Nash equilibrium point.
Proof of Theorem 2: Starting with the expression of y; as given by (5) and substituting it into the expression for y;, we obtain where k(z,) represents the first two terms of (8a) where we have used the fact that independent of the probabilistic structure of the decision problem. Hence they should imply the existence and counterpart of the problem, which are nonsingularity of the matrices [I-DiL7'D,DbT1D,i], i # j , i j = 1,2 (see e.g.
1D21)'rl'
[3], [ 141). It can in fact be shown directly that conditions (7a) and (7b) imply nonsingularity of these matrices (see 
JOINTLY GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTIONS
For an important class of dec.ision problems in which distributions, the unique Bayes decision rules given by ~~E 2 1 l E 1 , 2 ( y -~)~(~~Q~~E 1 1 2 ( y -5 )~~~~~~~y -~~~~~= d ( y ,~) . Theorem 2 can actually be explicitly computed and be shown to be linear in the observation of each DM.
To be more specific in the description of the informaHence, we have shown that tion structure of each DM, we assume that observations
Since qli is a nonexpansive transformation by Lemma 1, the probabilistic structure is characterized by Gaussian of DM1 and DM2 are given by 
Using condition (7a), this last inequality implies that K is a contraction mapping, which in turn establishes existence of a unique fixed point by direct application of Banach's contraction mapping principle, since f;; is a complete metric space.
Since relation (5) determines y:( .) uniquely for every fixed y , ( -) E q;, existence and uniqueness of y; also implies existence and uniqueness of E e;. Hence we have proven that under condition (7a) there exists a unique Nash equilibrium solution.
We could instead have started with the expression of y: as given by ( 9 , substitute it into the expression for y;. and obtain an equation y,*(iJ = i7y;(z2), where is defined as in (8a) but with 1's and 2's switched around. It can similarly be shown that K is a contraction mapping under condition (7b), from which follows the uniqueness of y:
and y,*. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Q.E.D.
Remark 1: Since we derived conditions (7a) and (7b) using similar methods and for the same decision problem. it may appear at first glance that they are equivalent. However, this is not so, as it can easily be seen via the following counterexample. Let DM1 control a onedimensional decision variable, and DM2 control a twodimensional decision vector. Further, let assumed to be real-valued matrices of dimensions m, X n and m2 X n, respectively. We note parenthetically that to assume zero means €or the random vectors involved does not bring any loss of generality, but saves a lot of extra notation and computation.
The results of this section are then summarized in Theorem 3 below.
Theorem 3
With the setup described above and under either of the conditions (7a) or (7b) (1 1b) 
G HlQHT(H2QHT+ II,)-'H,QH:(H,QHT+
of G'. The proof will then be completed if we can show that lAmm(P)l < 1 and IA, , (G *)I < 1. (1 le)
Or equivalently, B solves the equation
where P", 6, and F are defined as in (1 1b)-( 1 Id) with only 1' s and 2' s switched around, and A is then given by
Proof of Theorem 3: Using the well-known result
, it is not difficult to see that yT(z,)= A z , satisfies (8a) for any A solving (1 la). And further substitution of this solution into the expression for y;(z2) given by ( 5 ) provides us with the linear policy Bz, where B is given by (1 le). Analogously, starting with y; = Bz, and going through a similar reasoning, it can be seen that B satisfies (12a) and A is given by (12b). It should be clear from the above discussion that there exists a solution to (1 la) if, and only if, there exists a solution to (12a).
Hence, in order to complete the proof of Theorem 3, it will be sufficient to prove that there exists at least one solution of (1 la) under either of conditions (7a) or (7b). Uniqueness of this solution then follows from Theorem 2. In what follows we will in fact show directly that there exists a unique ( r , X m,) matrix A that satisfies (1 la). Now, define an (r,m,)-dimensional vector a such that the ijth entry of A is the [(i-I)m, +j]th element of a. Define a vector f which is related to F in a similar manner. Then (1 la) can also be written as
where I is the (rlnzl X r , m , ) identity matrix, and PBG' denotes the ( r l m l x r,m,)-dimensional Kronecker product of P and G T . Equation (13) has a unique solution for allf if, and only if, ( I + P @ G') is nonsingular. Hence, it will be sufficient to show that IReA(P@GT)I < 1 for all A(-).
We know from a property of Kronecker products that (Bellman [6, p. 2351) A( P €3 G ' ) = pj& As it has earlier been mentioned in [4], zero-sum games and team problems can be considered as two extreme cases of nonzero-sum games, or by looking at it in another way, every zero-sum game and every two-person team problem can be treated within the framework of nonzerosum two-person games by properly defining the objective functions of the two players. In particular, a zero-sum game is a two-person nonzero-sum game in which J I ( x , u I , u2)= -J2(x, u,, u2), and a two-person team problem is a nonzero-sum game with Jl(x, uI,u2) = J 2 ( x , ul,uJ.
The following two propositions now follow readily from the static property of the information structures considered in this paper (see also Lemma AI in the Appendix).
Proposition I : For the objective functions (1) defined in Section 11, Nash equilibrium solutions of the decision problem considered in this paper are equivalent to equilibrium solutions of a particular zero-sum game in which DM1 is the minimizer and DM2 the maximizer, if D,, = -PO,', for some positive scalar p.
Proposition 2: For the same objective functions, the Nash equilibrium solutions are equivalent to person-byperson optimal solutions of a particular two-person team problem if Dl,= LYD; for some positive scalar a .
It should be apparent at the outset that the optimality and uniqueness of the solutions reported in Theorems 2 and 3 are directly applicable to these two special classes of problems defined in Propositions 1 and 2. For the zerosum game, the optimal Nash solution is known as a saddle-point solution (or a minimax solution) under the given information structures. It now follows that there exists a unique saddle-point solution to the zero-sum game defined by Proposition 1, under either of conditions (7a) or (7b). It is, of course, possible to establish existence of a saddle-point in zero-sum games by other, possibly simpler, methods which might result in conditions less restrictive than (7a) and (7b). In particular, for the LQG zero-sum .. .. game, a direct substitution of linear policies into the objective function results in a less restrictive condition for existence of a saddle-point, which is nonsingularity of the matrix ( I + P €3 G') that was defined in the proof of Theorem 3. Nonsingularity of this matrix is definitely where is any eigenvalue of P and b, is any eigenvalue value.
4h,,( .) denotes the eigenvalue of (.) which is maximum in absolute implied by either (7a) or (7b) gives the desired result. Q.E.D. Remark 3: The result proven above now makes the statements of Theorems 2 and 3 even stronger. For the extreme case when the decision problem becomes equivalent to a team problem, the solution given by ( 5 ) (and by (loa), (lob) for the special LQG case) is not only personby-person optimal but also globally team optimal. When Dl,= aDA. the linear solution (loa), (lob) becomes analogous to the recursive linear solution provided by Radner in [ 171. As in the minimax case. this implies that the statements of Theorems 2 and 3 will be valid for a wider range of the parameters of the problem than those imposed by either of the conditions (7a) and (7b) (since condition (14) does not necessarily imply either of (7a) or (7b)).
which has shortened the original indirect proof of the equivalence 5I would llke to thank an anonymous referee for this observation between. (17) and (14).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered a class of static two-person two-objective decision problems in which the objective functions are quadratic in the decision vectors, and the primitive random variables have arbitrary probability distributions with finite second-order moments. For this class of problems, we have derived sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique pair of Nash equilibrium solutions. The sufficient conditions derived are independent of the probabilistic structure of the problem. When the underlying probability distribution is jointly Gaussian, we have shown that these unique equilibrium solutions are linear in the observations of each DM. For two special extreme cases, characterized by minimax and team problems, these linear policies constitute a saddle-point solution and a globally optimal team solution, respectively.
An extension of these results to N-person N-criteria decision problems is quite possible, if not immediate, by altering and generalizing some of the techniques involved. This will be considered in a forthcoming paper.
An extension of these results to dynamic decision problems in full generality, however, does not seem to be possible since Witsenhausen's counterexample [18] for a special extreme case cautions us not to take a quick further step. On the other hand, another special extreme case (a minimax problem) considered in [ 5 ] indicates that at least for some range of the parameters, the LQG decision problem with nonclassical dynamic information structure will admit unique equilibrium solutions which are linear in the observations of each DM. It is quite a challenge at this stage to see how much further one can push this range for existence of unique equilibrium solutions, and to investigate why and where a boundary appears (in the parameter space) between unique and nonunique solutions.
APPENDIX
Lemma AI 1) Using the terminology of Section I, if x(.,.,.) is a measurable functional in the three variables x,u1,u2, and g,(.,.) is a measurable functional in the two variables x,?, i#j,i,j= 1,2, then a pair { y,,y2} constitutes a Nash equilibrium pair for the nonzero-sum stochastic game defined by the objective functionals that h(x,ui, ui) does not contain any additive terms independent of u;.) 2) The active part of any convex quadratic functional of the three variables x,u,, uz can be expressed as in (l), consisting of only three terms and with D, > 0.
